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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF ROY,
a Public Agency,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Supreme Court No. 20517
vs.
KEITH S. JONES, AND
LORIS M. JONES,
Defendants-Appellants
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF CASE
This is an eminent domain case brought by the Redevelopment
Agency of Roy (hereinafter "RDA" or "Agencv") to condemn
the property of Keith S. Jones and Loris M. Jones (formerly
spouses) located in Roy, Utah.
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
The matter was tried before a jury with the Honorable
John F. Wahlquist, District Judge, presiding, which resulted
in a jury verdict of just compensation and a judgment on
the verdict of $128,000 (R.113) and reasonable moving
expenses to the Defendant-Appellant, Loris M. Jones of
$18,300.

(Mr. Jones made no claim for relocation or

moving expenses).

Subsequent to the trial, Loris M. Jones

made a Motion pursuant to UTAH CODE ANNO. § 11-19-23.9 for the
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Court to award reasonable attorney's fees.
was denied.

Said Motion

Mrs. Jones appeals from both the jury verdict

and the Court's denial of an award of attorney's fees.
Mr. Jones has not joined in the Appeal.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED UNSUPPORTED
OPINION TESTIMONY AS TO THE SIZE OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY AND PROPERLY JUDICIALLY NOTED TO THE
JURY A MATHEMATICAL COMPUTATION AS TO THE
POSSIBLE SIZE OF SAID PROPERTY.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT REFUSE TO ALLOW
EVIDENCE OF PROPER MOVING EXPENSES AS TO
APPELLANT - BUT DID PROPERLY EXCLUDE MOVING
COSTS OF NON-PARTIES (ADULT-EMANCIPATED CHILDREN).

III.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS
DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO ALLOW ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND SUCH AN AWARD WOULD NOT BE PROPER
UNDER THE RELOCATION ACT.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

On October 19, 1982, the RDA passed and adopted a
resolution authorizing the acquisition by condemnation of
the subject property for inclusion within a Redevelopment
Project.

(Exhibit "B" to Complaint R.6).

The subject property

was described as Exhibit D (R.IO) to the Complaint as follows:
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The land referred to is in the State of Utah, County of
Weber and is described as follows:
Part of the Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter
of Section 13, Township 5 North, Range 2 West, Salt
Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey: Beginning at a point 869.2
feet North and 383 feet East and South 70.3 feet from
the Southwest corner of the Northwest Quarter of said
Southwest Quarter Section; running thence North 36°30f
West 97.07 feet, more or less, to the East line of
Highway; thence Southwesterly along said East line to a
point North 89°15f East of a point 683.2 feet North of
said Southwest corner of Northwest Quarter of Southwest
Quarter Section; thence North 89°15' East 281 feet,
more or less, to a point 409 feet North 89°15f East of
the West line of said Southwest Quarter Section; thence
North 10°40f West 108.2 feet; thence North 36°30f West
11.93 feet to the place of beginning.
Said description is identical to that contained in the
Warranty Deed through which the Jones obtained title to the
property.

(Exhibit 22D.)

The description does, however,

contain a flaw in that it does not precisely close and must
be "forced" to closure, (R.426-27, 432-33) but by doing so
the square footage could be altered only in "...a minor
amount ... maybe ten square feet ..." (R.432.)
Prior to the Condemnation Resolution above-described,
the RDA on September 17, 1982 made an "offer to purchase"
the subject property (using the above description thereof)
for the sum of $150,000.

(Exhibit f23D.) The offer was

never accepted by Jones, but, likewise, was never withdrawn
or terminated by the RDA.
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1

During their case-in-chief, the Jones called as an
expert witness Mr. D. Bruce Whited, a licensed surveyor and
engineer who testified that he "... resurrect[ed] the
property on paper, and from that I used standard procedures
to calculate the acreage.11 (R.297.)

His opinion was that

the description contained 33,197 square feet or 0.7605
acres. (R.299.)
The RDA called as an expert during their case-in-chief
Mr. Jay Anderson, a licensed surveyor and engineer who
testified that by using a computer to do the mathematical
computations, and by forcing the description to close along
straight lines, the property contained "... 31,423 square
feet.,f

(R.428.)

Each side produced aerial photos taken of the property,
some of recent vintage, others more ancient in origin
(Exhibits IP, 2P, 3P, 20D and 21D) but neither side had
accomplished an actual survey of the property prior to
trial.
On the final day of trial, Mrs. Jones sought to offer
as a "rebuttal11 witness, another surveyor and engineer,
ostensibly to testify that the subject property contained
"... 36,871.8 square feet."

The Court, sua sponte, excused

the jury and considerable in camera examination occurred by
the Court of the witness, Mr. Robert Jones, wherein the

BRIEF - Page 4

witness acknowledged that one of his calculations would have
the property contain "...31,984.8" [square feet] (R.740,
760), but by "relocating" the property or pushing everything
to the south by 20 feet or so, the property could be enlarged
to contain "36,871.8" square feet. The Court refused to
allow such "unscientific evidence" and considered the same
totally baseless in that it required an entire realignment
of extant property lines clearly visable by the aerial
photos in evidence.

Objection was made by the RDA that the

proffered evidence was not in the nature of "rebuttal
evidence". (R.753.)
A plenary trial was held on March 29 through April 3,
1984, resulting in a verdict of $128,000 as just compensation
together with $18,300 as reasonable relocation expenses for
Mrs. Jones.

(R.113.)

The Trial Court refused to award

attorney's fees pursuant to UTAH CODE ANNO. § 11-19-23.9 and
determined that the Jones were not the "prevailing party."
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED UNSUPPORTED
OPINION TESTIMONY AS TO THE SIZE OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY AND PROPERLY JUDICIALLY NOTED TO THE JURY
A MATHEMATICAL COMPUTATION AS TO THE POSSIBLE SIZE
OF SAID PROPERTY.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT REFUSE TO ALLOW
EVIDENCE OF PROPER MOVING EXPENSES AS TO APPELLANT
BUT DID PROPERLY EXCLUDE MOVING COSTS OF NONPARTIES (ADULT-EMANCIPATED CHILDREN).

III.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS
DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO ALLOW ATTORNEY'S FEES
AND SUCH AN AWARD WOULD NOT BE PROPER UNDER THE
RELOCATION ACT.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED UNSUPPORTED
OPINION TESTIMONY AS TO THE SIZE OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY AND PROPERLY JUDICIALLY NOTED TO THE JURY
A MATHEMATICAL COMPUTATION AS TO THE POSSIBLE SIZE
OF SAID PROPERTY.

Space limitations would not allow a detailed recital of
the in camera examination by the Court of the basis for the
proffered "rebuttal" testimony of Mr. Robert Jones found in
the transcript. (R.737-753.)

Suffice it to say that the

Court found the proffered "opinion" testimony of the expert
to be "... not supported by scientific count and their
measurements..."

(R.746.)

Upon hearing of the Defendant's

Motion for a New Trial, the Court articulated, in detail,
the reason and substance for its refusal to allow testimony
of the nature proffered and for the convenience of the
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Court, a copy of Judge Wahlquist's specific findings in that
regard is attached as Appendix "A" hereto. (R.205-212.)
It is well settled law that testimony in the form of
opinion which is found by the Court to be unsupported in
fact or acceptable scientific theory is non-admissible.
Dixon v^ Stewart, 658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982) holding that the
trial court has considerable discretion in determining
whether expert testimony is admissible; Maltby v. Cox
Construction Co. 598 P.2d 336 (Utah 1979) wherein the Court
held that it is largely within the discretion of the trial
judge to pass on qualifications of an expert witness as to
whether he [witness] can give sound and reliable help to
jury; Lamb v\_ Bangart, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974) held that
the trial court is allowed considerable latitude of discretion
in admissibility of expert testimony, and in the absence of
a clear showing of abuse, reviewing court will not reverse;
Marsh v\_ Irvine, 22 Utah 2d 154, 449 P.2d 996, (1969) held
that the trial judge should be allowed reasonable latitude
of discretion both as to necessity for expert testimony and
as to the qualifications of each witness to give it.

See

also, Fillmore City v\_ Reeve, 571 P.2d 1316 (Utah 1977);
State Road Commission v^_ Silliman, 22 Utah 2d 33, 448 P.2d
347 (1968); Stagmeyer v. Leatham Bros., Inc., 20 Utah 2d
421, 439 P.2d 279 (1968); Taylor v. Johnson, 18 Utah 2d 16,
414 P.2d 575 (1966).
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Moreover, the legal description, albeit imperfect, is
capable of producing, mathematically, a determination of
the square footage therein contained.

Only

fl

minor adjust-

ment" is required by forcing closure of the description.
The RDAfs expert put it at 31,423 square feet.

Even the

landowners expert testified:
A.

[Mr. Jones - Surveyor] That [identifying Exhibit
49-P] was a legal description of what we ascertained
would be the Jones property within their original
deed if it were surveyed correctly.

Q.

And how many square feet were in that?

A.

I'm afraid I left it down -- itfs 31,000 something. Brent, have you got that? I think I left
it on that sheet. No, excuse me, I have it;
31,984.8 square feet." (R.760.)

During the trial, the Court, sua sponte, addressed the
size of the property in a judicially noticed fact to the
jury:
11

THE COURT:
Just a moment. Sometimes the jury is
instructed to take judicial notice of certain items.
One of the items which the Court will take judicial
notice of is as follows: Concerning the size of this
property, the Court takes judicial notice of the
general principles of mathematics. If this is calculated it will end up between 31,000 feet and 32,000
feet in total. The Court has made this calculation and
this is true. You must, however, recognize that there
are some inherent problems in this. This calculation
is based on the description which is contained in the
evidence. However, this particular land does not
close. This is not unusual. It happens occasionally.
And that is, if you start at one place and you follow
the exact measurements and then you follow the next -the curve at 500 so many feet to a certain number
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of feet, then you go on up straight, and then you come
back down, there will be a space where •— between the
two. Do you follow me? This happens sometimes and —
in other words, descriptions do not always close. It
indicates that there's some type of minor error somewhere.
It's 11 -- between 11 and 12 feet off. And it doesn't
close the description. Closing it the best in some
type of reasonable fashion could cause a variance of
some feet this way or that way. It means that someplace
there's an error out there. But the error would end up
somewhere so that the land is somewhere between 31,000
and 32,000 feet. That's the best I can do.
MR. FOREMASTER:
honor?
THE COURT:

Can Counsel approach the bench, your

Yes.

(Whereupon a conference was held at the bench.)
THE COURT:

It's probably closer to 32,000 than 31.

(Whereupon the conference continued.)
THE COURT: If you can -- because there's an error
somewhere,, they can cause this assumption of the Court
to be wrong, then you can recalculate it. But if the
assumption of the Court is correct, that the curve -because just the measurement is improper, then that
would be the measurement. But if the error is in
someplace else, then it could be different. You may
proceed.
MR. HANDY: I think at this time I would interpose an
objection to the comments of the Court. We had testimony
from engineers — we'll have testimony from engineersr.
I think that is what the evidence will be submitted to
the jury.*
THE COURT: The Court will take judicial notice of
normal calculations, like 20 times 20 is 400, and we
don't leave that to jurors or anyone else. We just do
it, just as when you calculate — when you make your
assessment of damages, the assessment will be as of
February the 28th, but the Court will add the interest
into that and you won't. In other words, the Court
makes normal mathematical calculations, not the jury.
(R.639-642.)

BRIEF - Page 9

While giving a 1,000 square foot deference to the fact
that the property description is "imperfect", the Court took
proper judicial notice of mathematical calculations within a
reasonable range of certainty and about which, because it
involved only mathematical calculation, no reasonable mind
could differ.

Such is clearly within the recognized province

of the Court under Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
"RULE 201. JUDICIAL NOTICE OF ADJUDICATIVE FACTS.
(a)

Scope of rule.
This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
(b) Kinds of facts.
A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject
to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination
by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
be questioned.
(c) When discretionary.
A court may take judicial notice, whether requested
or not.
(d) When mandatory.
A court shall take judicial notice if requested by
a party and supplied with the necessary information.
(e) Opportunity to be heard.
A party is entitled upon timely request to an
opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking
judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed. In
the absence of prior notification, the request may be
made after judicial notice has been taken.
(f) Time of taking notice.
Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the
proceeding.

BRIEF - Page 10

(g)

Instructing jury.
In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall
instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact
judicially noticed. In a criminal case, the court
shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not required
to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed.11
Mathematical computations are generally of the nature
described above and are permitted to be judicially noted.
See, Miller v. Federal Land Bank of Spokane, 587 F.2d 415,
422 (9th Cir. 1978) wherein the Court judicially noted
principal and interest calculations and adjustments; Williams
v. Moran, et al^, 205 F. Supp. 208, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)
wherein the Court judicially calculated and transposed
nautical miles to statute miles; Burry v. National Trailer
Convoy, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 85, 90 (E. D. Tenn. 1963) wherein
the Court judicially computed distance and time travel in
minimum wage claims.
Facts judicially noted can and have been used by our
Courts to solve property description defects.
v. Chournos

Utah

133 P.2d 318 (1943).

See, Keller
Geometric

calculations like those involved in this case are properly
judicially noted.

See, Beams v. Werth, 200 Kan 532, 438

P.2d 957 (1968).
One final point wholly negates the Appellants argument
for reversal on these grounds. The Appellant fails to even
argue or suggest how the instruction of the Court to the

BRIEF - Page 11

jury had any adverse or negative affect on their case or
that their "... substantial right ..." was affected as
required by Rule 103 of Utah Rules of Evidence.

Both the

record and Appellant Brief acknowledge and confirm that the
issue of "square footage" is really a subterfuge and fiction
since the landowners case-in-chief included without objection
or restriction the testimony by their appraisers as to the
fair market value of the Jones property.

Mr. Brown testified

that the property was worth $215,400 (R.340 - Exhibit 25-D)
Mr. Heiskanen testified that the property was worth $213,500
(R.401 - Exhibit 27-D).

Both these figures were argued to

the jury in closing by the Landowners Counsel. (R. 767-68.)
So, rhetorically, where is the substantial right affected by
the Court's ruling?

Even if erroneous, Judge Wahlquist's

comments are "harmless error."
II.
II.

(See Appendix A, R.211.)

ARGUMENT

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT REFUSE TO ALLOW EVIDENCE
OF PROPER MOVING EXPENSES AS TO APPELLANT - BUT
DID PROPERLY EXCLUDE MOVING COSTS OF NON-PARTIES
(ADULT-EMANCIPATED CHILDREN).

Appellant asserts that she was prohibited from seeking
moving or relocation expenses for her "business", arguendo,
is a prevarication of the record, either by intent or lapse
of counsel's memory.

BRIEF - Page 12

Mrs. Jones offered in great detail the moving and
"relocation" of trailers which she "rented", even though
such conduct ("business") was not allowed on the property
and she maintained no business license to so operate.
Evidence was offered and received as follows:
1.

That Mrs. Jones had to relocate seven trailers.

(R.473.)
2.

Aztec trucking expense of $2,530 to move the

double-wide trailer.

(R.478.)

3.

Uintah Towing of $75 and $151.25.

(R.480.)

4.

Pattys Towing - $150.

5.

United Van Lines - $3,144.86.

6.

Circle R motel expenses for Mrs. Jones and her

(R.482.)

"... children ..." - $467.55.

(R.483.)

(R.484.)

7.

"Set-up" fees for trailer - $557.71.

(R. 485.)

8.

Miscellaneous expenses - $19.73 and $19.55 (R.486.)

9.

Miscellaneous expenses - $38.00 and $21.05.

(R.487.)
10.

Steam clean carpets - $65.10.

11.

Two telephone hook-ups - business and private -

$178.56.

(R.487.)

(R.488.)

12.

City permits - $2,097.

13.

Replacement of stolen lawn mowers and T.V.

antennas - $180.
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(R.497.)

(R.488.)

14.

Repair to trailers of damage occurring during

the move - $286.79.
15.

(R.498.)

Lost wages - $444.

(R.501.)

All of her expenses were summarized on Exhibit 43-D
which was offered and received in evidence.
Mrs. Jones claimed she was in the "business" of renting
out these trailers, and, in fact, she was allowed to claim
relocation expenses for moving them and the jury awarded her
$18,300 as such expenses.
What was properly excluded was evidence found by the
Court to be of a duplicitous nature:
1.

For the improvements on the condemned property

and "replacing" those same improvements on a relocation
site.
2.

Making "improvements" not originally found at the

condemned site so that the same did not constitute
"relocating" expenses.
a trailer.)
3.

(i.e., adding a basement under

(R.490, 503.)

Claiming the purchase of a building lot as "relo-

cation"

expenses.

(R.476-77.)

The applicable statute is the UTAH CODE ANNO. $ 11-1923.9(2) which, in pertinent part, provides as follows:
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1

* * ic

The Court, or jury in cases tried before a jury, may
also award a reasonable sum as compensation for the
costs and expenses, if any, of relocating the owner
whose property is acquired or a party conducting a
business on such acquired property, An~award may also
be made for damages to any fixtures or personal property
owned by the owner of such acquired property or owned
by the person conducting a business on such acquired
property, if such fixtures or personal property are
damaged as a result of such acquisition or relocation.
What Appellant really complains of is the Court's
refusal to allow her to claim as relocation expenses the
costs of relocating trailers which did not belong to her
but, instead, were owned by her "children".

Appellant fails

to point out to the Court that said "children" are and were,
in fact, emancipated adults and non-parties to this action
having no ownership interest in the real estate and not a
"person or [party] conducting a business on such acquired
property." as defined in the applicable statute. Two of the
seven trailers involved turned out to be owned, one each,
by Mrs. Jones two sons, ages 20 and 23.

(R.515-17.) As

such, Mrs. Jones is in no position to assert or claim
relocation expenses for property moved which did not belong
to her and the Court properly excluded such evidence from
the jury's consideration.

See, Rule 17 (a) Rules of Civil

Procedure - Real Party in Interest and UTAH CODE ANNO. § 152-1 as to length of minority.
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Said claims rightfully belong to and must be asserted
by the two adult sons under the Utah Relocation Assistance
Act, UTAH CODE ANNO. § 57-12-1 e£ se£, and particularly
§ 57-12-7(1).
Although no provision is made within the Relocation Act
for expenses of "children" of a displaced "person", a good
argument could be made that such family expenses should be
covered, but that issue is not before the Court under the
facts of this case.
III.

ARGUMENT

III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION
IN REFUSING TO ALLOW ATTORNEY'S FEES AND SUCH AN
AWARD WOULD NOT BE PROPER UNDER THE RELOCATION
ACT.
The trial court was asked by Motion following the jury
verdict to award attorney's fees to Mr. and Mrs. Jones under
the UTAH CODE ANNO. § 11-19-23.9 which in pertinent part
provides as follows:
"... the Court may, in cases where the amount of
the award exceeds the amount offered, award in addition
to his just compensation, costs, including a reasonable
attorney's fee as determined by the Court."
Examination of such statute indicates two reasons why
Appellants claim for attorney's fees was properly denied by
the Court.

BRIEF - Page 16

First, under the statute, the possibility of an award
of attorney's fees does not arise unless and until "... the
award exceeds the amount offered..."
The unrebutted evidence is that the landowners were
offered, in writing, $150,000 for the subject property.
(Exhibit 23-D.)

Said offer was not broken down on a per

square foot basis, but was a flat $150,000 for the described
property - the legal description being included and set
forth in the offer.

Admittedly, the offering price was

arrived at based on a misunderstanding on the part of the
RDA.

But, nevertheless, it became the "offer" to the

landowners required by the UTAH CODE ANNO. § 57-12-13(3) and
could have been accepted at any time prior to trial by the
landowners.

Said offer was never withdrawn, replaced or

amended and was never accepted by the landowners.

Therefore,

a jury verdict of $128,000 does not "exceed the amount
offered..." and the condition precedent to invocation of the
statute has not occurred.
Secondly, the statute is permissive and not
in nature.

mandatory

Even if the "award exceeds the amount offered",

the Act provides that in such circumstances the Court "may",
but not "shall", award attorney's fees.

Apparently the

Court didn't feel that the landowners were justified in
claiming and asserting that the property was worth $215,000
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when the jury found the property to be worth only $128,000.
(See Appendix "A" hereto for Judge Wahlquist's findings that
the landowners were not the "prevailing party11.)

Since the

statute is permissive and not mandatory, the Courtfs discretion
should not be altered or set aside by this Court unless such
discretion was exercised arbitrarily.
Since the rule allows the trial court discretion in
this matter, this Court will not and should not reverse that
order unless it is clearly shown that the trial court abused
that discretion.

It is this Court's policy to accord great

deference to discretionary conclusions of the trial court
regarding attorney fees.

Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley

Dairy Ass'n., 657 P.2d 1279 (Utah 1982); an award of attorney
fees is within the sound discretion of the trial court and
will not be overturned in absence of showing of clear abuse,
Sears v^ Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982); or finally,
in the absence of a showing of patent error or clear abuse
of discretion in an award of attorney fees, this Court will
not disturb the judgment of the trial court, Alexander v.
Brown, 646 P.2d 692 (Utah 1982).
CONCLUSION
The trial judge properly exercised his discretion in
regards to the proffered testimony of Mr. Robert Jones,
engineer, and excluded said testimony.
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The Court also

properly took judicial notice of the principles of calculus
and facts commonly within the knowledge of the community
regarding the property lines and properly instructed the
jury as to the size limitations of the subject property.
Appellant does not show a clear abuse of that discretion.
Appellant is not the real party in interest to claim
relocation expenses for her emancipated adult sons, and she
was not prohibited from claiming all legitimate, non-duplicitous business relocation expenses.
The trial judge properly denied an award of attorney
fees since the Appellant did not recover more than the
amount offered by the RDA and such determination is a matter
of discretion with the trial court not reversible where
there has been no showing of abuse of said discretion.
The judgment on the verdict and the denial of an award
of attorney fees should and must be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of August, 1985.

Harold A. Hintze
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondem
2230 University Parkway
Suite 9E
Provo, Utah 84604
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and
correct copies of the BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to Phillip
L. Foremaster, Attorney for Appellant, 165 North 100 East,
Suite 1, P. 0. Box 572, St. George, Utah
DATED this j d~

84770.

day of August, 1985.

JUL

ujfig, S^cr
Debbie YoujAg,
Secretary

APPENDIX "A"

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE ^OF tJTAH
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF
ROYf a public agency,
MEMORANDUM OF COURTfS
RULING

Plaintiff,
vs.
KEITH S. JONES and
LORIS M. JONES,

Case No.

84431

Defendant.

Defense attorney is invited to submit documents for the
Court's

signature

consistent

with

that

indicated

below.

The

verdict stands.

THE SIZE OF THE AREA TAKEN
Neither side surveyed the area in question in anticipation

of this litigation.

To

conduct

such

a survey

after

the

litigation was under way would have presented great difficulties.
By that time, the land and all adjoining lands had been distributed

so

that

the

natural

markings are, howeverf
have been presented
photographs.
Many

of

community

markings

were

gone.

The

reflected in the aerial photographs that

by both sidesf

and also

some

of

the other

The area is also a part of a well-known

the members

natural

of

the

jury

will

have

the

same

landmark.
type

recall concerning this area that the Court has.

of
The

Court's memory goes back more than 50 years, and recalls that at
that
Lake.

time the area

involved

the main

road

from

Ogden

to Salt

The first viadock constructed over the extensive railroad
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tracks west of Ogden was what was known as 24th Street.

This

came out of the middle of Ogden and proceeded due west over the
tracks, and permited traffic to flow over the tracks, and then
head off in a southwest direction toward a highway, which runs
almost north and south on up through Roy, north to Brigham City,
and

south

towards

Salt Lake.

Eventually

constructed over the tracks in Riverdale.

a new

viadock

was

This changed the main

route from Ogden to Salt Lake to be along Riverdale Road, until
it reached what was called

"Death's Curve", which is the area

here in question, and then proceeded south to Salt Lake.

Since

that time other roads, such as the one along the foot of the
mountains and the freeway, have been built just slightly to the
east of the area in question.

Death's Curve was well-known and

its location probably rivaled in importance in local conversation
to the actual existence of the City of Roy itself.

The new road

which brought Death's Curve into existence, actually by passed
Riverdale, as it was then known and has created a new Riverdale.
The junction of Riverdale Road and the main road to Salt
Lake and Death's Curve was almost a right angle.

As time passed,

highways were widened, construction work was done to allow for
merging traffic lanes, islands, stop signs, etc., and all that
changed
one.
times.

the appearance

of major

The change was a gradual

intersections,

including

this

one, and has been done many

The effect has changed what was almost a right-hand turn

if a person drove north from Roy to Ogden and turned on Riverdale
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Road

into what

effected

is today

a

by stop lights.

slow,

shape

the

presented

patterns

today

in

turnf

described

is

not

of

separate and divide the roads

traffic.

measuring

the

Part

true

of

size

is unusual.

the

of

contained in the fact that the manner in which
and

which

Out in front of the property to the

north would be the islands which
and

rounding

difficulty

this

land

is

it was surveyed

What would normally

be regarded

as

both the north line and the west line is actually not described
in the deeds, except to indicate that it is along the road.

Of

course the road has changed from a right angle to a long curve.
Undoubtedly
property

when

it

changed

in question was

this

way,

lessened.

This

actual

volume

situation

of

the

is further

clouded by the fact that what is a south line, a line that runs
virtually true east and west, is one of those lines described as
both more or less, the boundary that might be described as the
east

boundary

of

the property,

is broken

in

the middle

by an

angle so that it goes off slightly over 30 degrees to the west
after

it moves up approximately one-half

south line to the north line.

the distance

This problem

is further

from

the

compli-

cated by the fact that the last portion of the east line is also
described

as

"more or less" to the road.

In the early photo-

graphs, particularly the aerial ones, it can be immediately noted
that the south line and the east line are boundaries of an area
that had

been

settled

for more

than

one-half

a

century.

The

lines not only tie in such as this property tied to the property
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to the south and was indicated by a fence, but also the fence
extends on and ties onto other lands and other developments.
a limited extent this is true of the east line.

To

Clearly it was a

separation between this property and the property to the east.
ihe measurements that have to be relied upon in law are
fairly well defined insofar as the south line is concerned.

It

can be determined by measuring things across the street, and also
such measurements tie into other adjoining properties, and can be
reasonably located.

The line on the east is more difficult to

locate today, but can be located clearly on ancient aerial photographs.

The problem is somewhat further complicated by different

measurements are anchored to different monuments.

Some measure-

ments are anchored to the monuments to the southwest, and others
are measured from monuments on the southeast.

Regardless of all

the difficulties which are presented, it is clear from the aerial
photographs and the testimony here given that there was a clear
understanding of those involved, and acceptance of markings that
were in the form of fence lines, etc., which
closely to the descriptions.

coincided

very

The Court finds that there cannot

be a reasonable difference of opinion as to where the south line
is or was.

The Court also finds that the measurements today

would indicate that the length of the line is very close to that
indicated.
locatable.

A portion

of

the

east

boundary

is also

clearly

The overall difficulty is that if you construct a map

to scale and rely on the southwest monument for those measurements, and the eastern monument for its measurements, then you
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accept the distances called for as exactly as they are called for
and ignoring the "more or less" line, and then for the north and
the

west

you

accept

the

public

documents

which

describe

the

location of the road, you come out with property which is 31,400
square feet in size.

This figure can be debated very

slightly,

because it is possible to not quite have the description close.
The Court has considered

the hypothesis

suggested

by the

land-

owners, which would raise the size of the property up to 34,000
square feet and finds it to be totally unwarranted.
this

hypothsis

would

be

to

ignore

ground as fence lines, etc.
make

what

surveys

could

what

was

To accept

reflected

on

the

The Court has invited the parties to

be

made

today

to

try

to

solve

this

problem, but absent any new evidence, the Court concludes that as
a matter
property

of

law

cannot

and
be

reasonable

larger

than

minds

cannot

32,000.

The

differ,
Court

and

the

recognizes

that, in making its calculations, it is plagued by certain difficulties and suggestions.
the line description
ments.

One of the difficulties has to do wih

of the road contained

in the public docu-

The southwestern portion of the line is described

as a

part of an arc of a circle that had a radius of more than 500
feet.
clearly

The projected
that

would be over

location

there has never

of
been

such a radius would
any measurement

some fences and intersect

it.

It

some buildings, in the

course of which extend almost a city block.
be is one of two things.

of

indicate

What this appears to

It is a use of a angle turn that the
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Court has seen in road construction.
fairly

frequently

traffic purposes.

seen

in road

An arc of that size is

construction

as desirable for

Secondly, it could be some engineer's estimate

who is familiar with such problems as he cited and measured with
the naked eye, and made up a description reasonably close.

If

this entire roadside line was expanded one way or the other ten
feet, it would still yield a total volume of between 31,000 and
32,000 square feet.

The landowners have been given the advantage

of the figure of 32,000 square feet.
Modern rules of evidence require that the Court take
judicial notice of the principles of science.

If the Court were

to simply turn its back on the problem in this case and permit
various parties to indulge in unwarranted assumptions and guesses
as to the size of the land, the Court would be abandoning its
responsibility to operating in as scientific a frame as is practicable.

The Court concludes that absent some new survey that

would clearly indicate otherwise, the Court's instruction that
the jurors consider that the property was approximately 32,000
square feet is as generous as is logical in the situation.
ATTORNEY'S FEES
The issue of attorney's fees as it is written in the new
statutes which makes it discretionary

if the Court desires to

grant to a property owner attorney's fees if the property owner
has

been

agency.

dealt

unfairly

or

erroneously

with

by

a

condeming

The statute provides that if a property owner secures a
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judgment larger than that which he was offered, the Court should
consider

the awarding of such fees.

In this particular

case

there is no question but that before this litigation started, the
landowners

were

offered

$150,000,

received from the jury's verdict.

which
Per

is

than

they

se they could not be

regarded as the prevailing party in any sense.
the landowners goes as follows:

more

The argument of

when the land was thought to be

much larger than it was, and the offer was made for $150,000,
that that equaled approximately $3.50 per square foot for their
land.

When the property was shown to be much smaller than was

originally thought, that if you divide the 32,000 square feet
into the total amount of the award, the figure per square foot is
now greater than it would have been granted by the offer.

If

this were a total summary of the situation, the Court would feel
that the landowners had an issue, but the Court concludes that
that is not the case.

While land in commercial areas frequently

sold by and referred to as sale per square feet, but the true
price is much more calculatable, in a commercial

area by the

exposure

and

to view,

flows, etc.

access

to

various

directions,

traffic

These types of considerations can change the square

foot value of the property by multiples as high as four or five.
It is unlikely that any purchaser of this land in question would
ever be interested in the exact square footage that just happens
to be there.

It is much more likely that the value and the sales

price would be arranged after a general consideration of the size
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of the area, and the determination as to whether or not it is
adequate for the purpose intended, but the big attention would be
on factors such as exposure, accessabilityf

and traffic flows.

The Court concludes that the Joneses are not the prevailing party
in this action and should not be awarded attorney's fees.
DATED this

*V day of Junef 1984.
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